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NOTES
COURTS-JUDICIAL IMMUNITY-PROSPECTIVE RELIEF AND
ATTORNEY'S FEES ALLOWED: Pulliam v. Allen, 104 S. Ct. 1970

(1984).
On January 10,
pepper Co., Virginia
demeanor for which
was a $500.00 fine.'

1980, the police arrested Richmond Allen in Culfor using abusive language. The offense was a misthere was no jail sentence; the maximum penalty
Magistrate Pulliam set bail at $250.00 and when

Allen was unable to meet it, she committed him to jail until his trial
fourteen days later.
Subsequent to his release and payment of the fine, Allen brought a
section 1983 action against Magistrate Pulliam and Judge Burke,
before who he had been tried, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief.
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia
found the practice of incarcerating persons for non-incarcerable offenses to be a violation of due process and equal protection and prospectively enjoined Magistrate Pulliam.2 Pursuant to section 1988, Allen was granted his request of $7,038 in attorney's fees and the award
was upheld by the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals.' The Supreme
Court granted certiorari' and held that judicial immunity does not bar

prospective injunctive relief under section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act
of 18715 or bar the award of attorney's fees under the Civil Rights
Attorney's Fees Award Act of 1976." Pulliam v. Allen, 104 S. Ct. 1970
(1984).7
I. VA. CODE § 18.2-416 (1982).
2. Allen v. Burke, No. 81 Civ. 0040A (E.D. Va. June 4, 1981). The district court dismissed
Judge Burke as his involvement was insignificant.
3. Allen v. Burke, 690 F.2d 376 (4th Cir. 1982).
4. 461 U.S. 904 (1983).
5. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Supp. V 1979) (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982)). [hereinafter cited as section 1983].
6. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (Supp. V 1976) (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982)). [hereinafter cited as section 1988].
7. Justice Blackmun wrote the majority opinion. Justice Powell wrote the dissenting opinion
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Judicial immunity began in England as a relatively narrow exception to judicial liability.8 Before the fourteenth century, false judgments, malicious judgments, or judgments that went beyond the scope
of the judge's authority resulted in personal liability. 9 By the fourteenth
century a distinction emerged between the courts of record and those
not of record.' 0 The former derived their authority from the King. The
record was analogous to the King's word, and the judge, as the source
of the record, could not be held liable for actions within his jurisdictional powers." Courts not of record, which were more numerous and
in closest contact with the people, had no such protection.' 2
By the early seventeenth century a struggle for jurisdiction developed between the King's courts, the ecclesiastical and seignorial courts,
and other courts of limited jurisdiction.' 3 The existence of judicial immunity for judges of courts of record or law courts gave them distinct
advantages over their rivals. In the leading case of Floyd v. Barker,'4
Lord Coke held that a judge brought before the Star Chamber on a
charge of conspiracy had absolute immunity. In so holding, he drew not
only from the potency of the record but also from two important policy
considerations. First, without immunity "there never will be an end of
causes: but controversies will be infinite . . . ."' Second, immunity
was necessary to maintain respect for the judiciary and the King.'" In
Hamond v. Howell,17 a third policy justification emerged. The court
held that it was inappropriate to sanction a judge for making an incorrect decision in matters properly before him. 8 The court reasoned that
the harm of mistaken actions was readily remediable.' 9
Gradually, the distinction between courts of record and courts not
of record faded, and judicial immunity was viewed as arising more
and was joined by Chief Justice Burger, Justice Rehnquist and Justice O'Connor.
8. See Feinman and Cohen, Suing Judges: History and Theory, 31 S.C.L. REV. 201 (1980);
Rubinstein, Liability in Tort of Judicial Officers, 15 U. TORONTO L.J. 317 (1964); and Thompson, Judicial Immunity and the Protection of Justices, 21 MOD. L. REV. 517 (1958).
9. 1 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLIsH LAW 213-15 (7th ed. 1956).
10. Id.
11. Feinman and Cohen, supra note 8,at 206.
12. 6 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 9, at 235-36.
13. 5 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 9, at 300-301, 429-432.
14. 77 Eng. Rep. 1305 (Star Chamber 1607). In an often cited companion case the court
held that a judicial act outside of the court's jurisdiction was not within the record and not protected. The Case of Marshalsea, 77 Eng. Rep. 1027 (C.P. 1610).
15. Floyd, 77 Eng. Rep. at 1306.
16. Id. at 1307.
17. 86 Eng. Rep. 1035 (C.P. 1677).
18. Id. at 1037.
19. Id. at 1036.
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from the nature of the judicial office.2 0 A second dichotomy gradually
emerged, however, which distinguished between superior and inferior
courts.2 Which courts comprised which category was never clear.22
Nevertheless, a judge of a superior court was not answerable when acting in a judicial capacity even if he acted maliciously or corruptly.2 3 A
judge of an inferior court was liable if he acted outside his jurisdictional powers," ' and this occurred frequently.2 5
The American response to the issue of judicial immunity, while
varied, was significantly influenced by the English law. It was not, however, until 1868 that the Supreme Court confronted the issue. In Randall v. Brigham,26 the Court adopted the general principle that all
judges were immune in civil actions "for any judicial act done within
their jurisdiction. 12 Judges of superior or general authority were not
liable "even when such acts are in excess of their jurisdiction, unless
' ' 28
perhaps . . . the acts . . . are done maliciously or corruptly.
Four years later, in 1872, the Supreme Court decided Bradley v.
Fisher,2 9 which was to become the leading case in establishing the
boundaries between judicial liability and immunity in America. Guided
primarily by the principle of judicial independence, Justice Field held
that "judges of courts of superior or general jurisdiction are not liable
to civil actions for their judicial acts, even when such acts are in excess
of their jurisdiction, and are alleged to have been done maliciously or
corruptly." 30 Only when acting in absence of jurisdiction should a
judge be held liable for his actions. 3' Although Justice Field spoke only
of judges of general jurisdiction, his decision blurred the distinction be20. Feinman and Cohen, supra note 8, at 211. Jurisdiction became a key determinant of
liability. When a judge acted outside his authority he was not afforded protection. Guinne v.
Poole, 125 Eng. Rep. 523 (1566). Lack of knowledge of jurisdictional facts would be a valid
defense but ignorance of the law was not. Houlden v. Smith, 117 Eng. Rep. 323 (Q.B. 1850).
21. Feinman and Cohen, supra note 8, at 214.
22. Id. at 215-218. In Terry v. Huntington, 145 Eng. Rep. 557 (Exch. 1668) and Taaffe v.
Downes, 13 Eng. Rep. 15 (C.P. Ireland 1813) superior courts were defined as the King's courts at
Westminster.
23. Fray v. Blackburn, 3 B. & S. 576, 578 (1863).
24. Terry v. Huntington, 145 Eng. Rep. 557 (Exch. 1668).
25. "In many situations the law provided no other form of remedy, and the courts used this
one so rigorously that Parliament had to intervene on several occasions to temper the wind to the
shorn lamb." Sirros v. Moore, 118 Q.B. 149 (1975).
26. 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 523 (1868).
27. Id. at 535.
28. Id. at 536.
29. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335 (1871).
30. Id. at 351. Note that Bradley closed the "maliciously or corruptly" exception of Randall.
31. Id. at 351-52. Absence of jurisdiction is an act for which there is clearly no jurisdiction
of subject matter. Id.
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tween general and limited jurisdiction with respect to immunity.3 2 In
response to Justice Field's ambiguous language, the lower courts
quickly expanded the logic of Bradley to include lower court judges as
well. 33
The early common law doctrines of judicial immunity both in England and in this country were concerned only with civil actions for
damages. Injunctions against judges have no corresponding history and
are largely the product of the modern courts and the recent expansion
of actions brought under the Civil Rights Acts of 1871. As the Court in
Pulliam v. Allen3 4 noted, "[n]one of the seminal opinions on judicial
or in this country, has involved immunity
immunity, either in England
35
relief."
injunctive
from
Section 198336 provides that "[elvery person" who acts "under
color of" state law to deprive another of his constitutional or federal
rights shall be liable in an action at law or suit in equity. The broadly
phrased language of the Act created new questions with respect to judicial immunity. First, did Congress intend to abrogate the common law
immunity? Second, could judges be subjected to injunctions in equity?
The legislative history of the Civil Rights Acts of 1866 and 1871
strongly suggested that Congress intended to reach all state actors, including judges. The section of the 1871 Act that became section 1983
was introduced by Representative Shellabarger who stated that the second section of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 3 "provides a criminal proceeding in identically the same case as this one [section 1983] provides
a civil remedy for." 3 8 President Johnson in his 1866 veto message gave
as his major objection to section two of the Civil Rights Act of 1866
that it would make legislators and judges criminally liable. 9 The veto
was overridden. In the debates, Senator Turnbull, the bill's sponsor,
stated, "a judge, if he acts corruptly or viciously in the execution or
under color of an illegal act, may be and ought to be punished." 4 0
32. While speaking only of judges of general jurisdiction, Justice Field in his examples of
jurisdiction used judges of limited, inferior jurisdiction. Id. at 352.
33. Feinman and Cohen, supra note 8, at 294-304.
34. 104 S.Ct. 1970-(1984).
35. Id. at 1978.
36. Ch. 22 § I, 17 Stat. 13 (1871) [Codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982)].
37. 14 Stat. 27 (1866). Now 18 U.S.C. § 242 (1982).
38. CONG. GLOBE, 42nd Cong., Ist Sess. 68 (App.) (1871). Also, Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S.
167 (1961), held that "under color of law" should be accorded the same construction in both §
1983 and § 242.
39. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., Ist Sess. 1680 (1866).
40. Id. at 1758. Similar statements were made by other congressmen: "Any judge ... who
is called upon to decide whether the State law is in force because this law is unconstitutional, shall
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The debates surrounding the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871,41 which
gave rise to section 1983,2 indicated that Congress felt just as strongly
about judicial liability as it had with the Civil Rights Act of 1866.43
The Supreme Court, too, in a recent review of the legislative history of
section 1983 stated: "This legislative history makes evident that Congress clearly conceived that it was altering the relationship between the
States and the Nation with respect to the protection of federally created rights . . . and it believed that these failings extended to the state
44

courts.

The early case of Ex parte Virginia" ' dealt with judicial immunity
and suggested that the Civil Rights Acts had indeed abolished the com-

mon law immunities. In that case, a judge was indicted under the predecessor of 18 U.S.C. section 243 for excluding qualified blacks from
jury lists. The Court held that the judge was acting in a ministerial

capacity and could claim no judicial immunity. The Court alternatively
found that even if his actions had been judicial, he would have been
liable for acts "not left within the limits of his discretion." 46
In the years that followed, however, the Civil Rights Acts were not
given the full effect of their broad language. 4 This resulted primarily
from the narrow reading given the statutory phrase "under color of"
law. In the early cases, "under color of" law was construed to mean
that only official conduct sanctioned by state law was actionable. If the
official acts were unauthorized by state law, a section 1983 remedy was

not available.48
hold it to be in force notwithstanding this law, is to be punished." Id. at 1778 (remarks of Senator
Johnson). "lI]tis better to invade the judicial power of the States than to permit it to invade,
strike down, and destroy the civil rights of citizens." Id. at 1837 (remark of Representative
Lawrence).
41. Ch. 22 § I, 17 Stat. 13 (1871) [now codified as 42 US.C. § 1983 (1982)].
42. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 derives from § I of the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871; 42 U.S.C. §
1985(3).
43. CONG. GLOBE, 42nd Cong., IstSess. 394 (1871) (remarks of Representative Rainey); Id.
at 429 (remarks of Representative Beatty); Id. at 153 (App.) (remarks of Representative Garfield); Id. at 277 (App.) (remarks of Representative Porter); Id. at 654 (remarks of Senator Osborne); Id. at 505 (remarks of Senator Pratt).
44. Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 242 (1972).
45. 100 U.S. 339 (1879).
46. Id. at 348.
47. Between 1871 and 1920 only 21 cases were brought under section 1983. Comment, The
Civil Rights Act: Emergence of an Adequate Federal Civil Remedy?, 26 IND. L.J. 361, 363
(1951); see also Comment, Federalism, Section 1983 and State Law Remedies: Curtailingthe
Federal Civil Rights Docket by Restricting the Underlying Right, 43 U. PiTT. L. REV. 1035, 1039
(1982); Note, The Proper Scope of the Civil Rights Acts, 66 HARv. L. REV. 1285 (1953).
48. Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268 (1939); Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927); see Comment, Federalism. Section 1983, supra note 47, at 1039 n.18; Developments in the Law--Section
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Beginning in the 1940's, "under color of" law was reinterpreted in
two Supreme Court cases. In United States v. Classic4 9 and Screws v.
United States,50 the Court held that official acts in violation of state
law would be "under color of" law for the purposes of sections 241 and
242.51 The close historical parallels between these criminal sections and
section 1983 set the stage for the breadth ultimately given section 1983
as a means of enforcing federal rights against unlawful state action.
Thus, in Monroe v. Pape,'52 a 1961 case, the Classic and Screws definition of "under color of" law was accorded to section 1983. Justice
Douglas concluded that "[t]he federal remedy is supplementary to the
state remedy, and the latter need not be first sought and refused before
the federal one is invoked.' 3
Despite the Classic and Screws holdings, the majority of the cir-

cuits held that the common law immunity of judges was undiminished
by the Civil Rights Act.' 4 These holdings were fostered in part by the
Supreme Court's 1951 decision of Tenney v. Brandhove." This case,
while addressing the immunity of state legislators, narrowed the broad
scope of the 1871 Act and made the courts less hesitant to find judicial
immunity." Prior to Tenney a few courts did hold that judges could be
liable under the 1871 Act as invigorated by Classic and Screws.5' The
Third Circuit Court of Appeals in Picking v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co.,'8
interpreted the intent of Congress as including members of the state
judiciary acting in an official capacity and held a judge liable for dam1983 and Federalism, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1133, 1159-1161 (1977) which suggest that the restrictive interpretation given "under color of" law was based on early courts' assumption that a violation of state law could not be state action under the fourteenth amendment, citing The Civil
Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883) and Barney v. City of New York, 193 U.S. 430 (1904).
49. 313 U.S. 299 (1941). "Misuse of power, possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law, is action taken 'under
color of' state law." Id. at 326.
50. 325 U.S. 91 (1945). "Acts of officers who undertake to perform their official duties are
included whether they hew to the line of their authority or overstep it." Id. at Il1.
51. 18 U.S.C. §§ 241, 242 (1976) (current version at 18 U.S.C. §§ 241, 242 (1982)).
52. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
53. Id. at 183.
54. E.g., Johnson v. MacCoy, 278 F.2d 37 (9th Cir. 1960); Tate v. Arnold, 223 F.2d 782
(8th Cir. 1955); Francis v. Crafts, 203 F.2d 809 (Ist Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 835
(1953); Morgan v. Sylvester, 125 F. Supp. 380 (S.D. N.Y. 1954), aff'd, 220 F.2d 758 (2d Cir.
1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 867 (1955); Souther v. Reid, 101 F. Supp. 806 (E.D. Va. 1951).
55. 341 U.S. 367 (1951).
56. See Comment, Immunity of Public Officials from Liability Under the Federal Civil
Rights Acts, 18 ARK. L. REV. 81, 85-86 (1964).
57. Cooper v. Hutchinson, 184 F.2d 119 (3d Cir. 1950); McShane v. Moldovan, 172 F.2d
1016 (6th Cir. 1949); Burt v. City of N.Y., 156 F.2d 791 (2d Cir. 1946).
58. 151 F.2d 240 (3d Cir. 1945).
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ages. "R.S. section 1979 applies to 'every person'. We can imagine no
broader definition." ' 9
The Supreme Court finally faced the issue of judicial immunity
under section 1983 in Pierson v. Ray.60 After reviewing the legislative
history of section 1983, the Court denied liability. The Court concluded
that since the common law doctrine of immunity was well established,
"we presume that Congress would have specifically so provided had it
wished to abolish the doctrine."6 1 The Court also relied on its decision
in Tenney,6" which held that legislative immunity was not abolished by
section 1983. By analogy, section 1983 did not abolish judicial immunity either. Thus, the Court reaffirmed Bradley v. Fisher3 and reiterated the concerns of replacing principled and fearless decision-making
with judicial intimidation.64 Moreover, the Court felt that judicial errors were correctable by appeal."
While Pierson clearly established judicial immunity as a defense
to actions brought under section 1983, the scope of that immunity was
not tested until the 1978 case of Stump v. Sparkman.6 In Stump, the
judge granted a mother's petition to have her fifteen year old, slightly
retarded daughter sterilized. The daughter did not learn of the nature
of the operation until much later when she was married and discovered
she could not have children. At that time she brought an action for
damages under section 1983 against Judge Stump.
The Supreme Court, freed by Pierson from the constraints of the
legislative debates, could rely almost entirely on the language of Brad6 7
ley v. Fisher.
The Court held that a judge will not be liable because
his action was in error, malicious, or in excess of his authority. He will
be liable only if he has acted in the absence of all jurisdiction, and by
state statute the circuit court had original and exclusive jurisdiction in
all cases of law and equity." Moreover, with this broad jurisdiction a
judge was immune even if his judicial acts were "flawed by the commission of grave procedural errors." 69 Judicial acts are to be tested by
59. Id. at 250. In Bauers v. Heisel, 361 F.2d 581 (3d Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1021
(1967), Picking was overruled, relying in part on the holding in Tenney.
60. 386 U.S. 547 (1967).
61. Id. at 554-55.
62. 341 U.S. 367 (1951).
63. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335 (1871).
64. Pierson, 386 U.S. at 554.
65. Id.
66. 435 U.S. 349 (1978).
67. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335 (1871).
68. 435 U.S. at 356-57.
69. Id. at 359.
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whether the act is normally preformed by a judge and whether the parties dealt with the judge in his official capacity.70
The second major unanswered question raised with the passage of
section 1983, the possibility of injunctive relief against prospective judicial acts, has had a much different history than that of the award of
damages. It was not until 1965 that a federal court addressed the issue.
In United States v. Clark,7 1 the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Alabama held that "[the] doctrine of judicial immunity applies only when those officials are faced with civil suits for
damages . . . .The doctrine has no application where, as here, the relief sought is preventive. ' 72 The court reasoned that injunctive relief
would not interfere with judicial discretion since it "will only prevent
the doing of what there is no right to do."' 73 The court, however, sensitive to the principle of comity existing between federal and state courts
and recognizing that relief could be attained by enjoining other parties,
declined to grant the injunction against the circuit judge.7" In 1967, the
between
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals similarly found a distinction
75
immunity from damages and that of injunctive relief.
Since these decisions, the majority of the circuit courts have now
held that judicial immunity is no bar to injunctive relief.76 The Eighth
of Appeal, however, have expressly declined
and Third Circuit Courts
77
to decide the issue.
Another important aspect in the issue of judicial immunity is the
78
This doctrine
abstention doctrine, as articulated in Younger v. Harris.
states a policy of non-interference with pending state criminal proceedings absent special circumstances (bad faith, harassment or a patently
invalid state statute). The doctrine is based on the idea of respect for
state functions, comity and the belief "that the National Government
will fare best if the States and their institutions are left free to perform
70. Id. at 362.
71. 249 F. Supp. 720 (S.D. Ala. 1965).
72. Id. at 727.
73. Id. at 728.
74. Id. at 729.
75. U.S. v. McLeod, 385 F.2d 734, 738 n.3 (5th Cir. 1967).
76. See, e.g., In re Justices of Supreme Court of Puerto Rico, 695 F.2d 17 (1st Cir. 1982);
Richardson v. Koshiba, 693 F.2d 911 (9th Cir. 1982); WXYZ, Inc. v. Hand, 658 F.2d 420 (6th
Cir. 1981); Harris v. Harvey, 605 F.2d 330 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 938 (1980);
Heimbach v. Village of Lyons, 597 F.2d 344 (2d Cir. 1979); Slavin v. Curry, 574 F.2d 1256 (5th
Cir. 1978).
77. R.W.T. v. Dalton, 712 F.2d 1225 (8th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1009 (1983);
Conover v. Montemuro, 477 F.2d 1073 (3d Cir. 1973) (on reh'g en banc).
78. 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
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their separate functions in their separate ways.""9 The holding in
Younger is important to the issue of judicial immunity in two ways.
First, Justice Stewart in his concurring opinion was careful to note that
the reluctance of the federal courts to intervene in on-going state criminal proceedings does not foreclose the possibility of injunctive or declaratory relief from future state criminal proceedings."0 Second, the
courts have repeatedly cited the doctrine's notions of comity and federalism as a way of providing limits on the use of the federal powers of
equity to enjoin state court judges.
Limits on injunctions under section 1983 are important in the balance of the various policy factors for and against judicial liability.
Within the circuit courts of appeal a number of limits have emerged.
In Conover v. Montemuro,81 the Third Circuit Court of Appeals
discussed two uses of comity to limit the number of section 1983 cases
asking for injunctive relief. First, the court employed the Younger doctrine of non-intervention in state criminal proceedings; second, the
court turned to the Pullman82 abstention doctrine which requires a federal court to refrain from intervening in a state court proceeding concerning an unresolved question of state law. On the basis of comity, as
embodied in Younger and Pullman, the court found it unnecessary to
decide whether an injunction should be issued against a state judge.83
In In re Justices of Supreme Court of Puerto Rico,8 4 the First
Circuit Court of Appeals admitted that judges were not immune from
injunctions but found that ordinarily there is no "case or controversy"
between a judge who adjudicates claims under a statute and a litigant
who attacks the statute's constitutionality.8 5 The court did not rest its
decision on this constitutional basis, however, but rather used the idea
of comity and proper party analysis.88 Under proper party analysis,
judges are not ordinarily considered as proper party defendants to a
section 1983 action. The judge has no stake in upholding the statute
and relief can normally be obtained by enjoining other non-judicial
parties. "[Section] 1983 does not provide relief against judges acting
purely in their adjudicative capacity, any more than . . . [a] state's
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

Id. at 44.
Id. at 55.
477 F.2d 1073 (3d Cir. 1973).
Railroad Commissioner of Texas v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941).
477 F.2d at 1093-94.
695 F.2d 17 (lst Cir. 1982).
Id. at 21.
Id. at 22.

40
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libel law imposes liability on a postal carrier."87
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals in R.W.T. v. Dalton88 also
refrained from finding a case or controversy in a suit for declaratory
and injunctive relief against several judges.8 9 The court elaborated on
the proper party analysis of Justices. While expressly not deciding the
reach of judicial immunity, the court found on the basis of proper party
analysis and comity that the judges in the case before it should not be
parties to the lawsuit.9 0 Central to the holding was the availability of
complete relief by enjoining other non-judicial parties. Thus, for the
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, the use of injunctive relief against a
state judge is only a last resort. It made no difference to the court
whether the attack was on the justices' practice (as in Pulliam v. Allen9 ) or on the constitutionality of the statute (as in Justices9 2 ).
The Supreme Court has established additional limits to injunctive
relief against a defendant judge. O'Shea v. Littleton" overturned an
injunction granted by the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals9 4 for failure to meet the case or controversy requirement of article III of the
Constitution. The Court noted that injunctive relief would conflict with
recognized principles of equitable restraint and could not be granted
even if a case or controversy existed. The injunction would be a continuing federal intrusion into state criminal proceedings.95 Further, the
Court found that respondents had failed to meet the equitable requirements of establishing the likelihood of irreparable injury and the inadequacy of remedies at law. 9 6
In Supreme Court of Virginia v. Consumers Union of the United
States Inc.,97 Consumers Union brought a 1983 action against the Virginia Supreme Court seeking a declaration that the court had violated
its constitutional rights to gather and publish information on attorneys
practicing in the county. It also sought a permanent injunction against
the enforcement of that portion of the Code of Professional Responsibility limiting attorney advertising. The Court declined to decide
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

Id.
712 F.2d 1225 (8th Cir. 1983).
Id. at 1232 n. 10.
Id. at 1232.
104 S.Ct. 1970 (1984).
712 F.2d at 1233.

93.

414 U.S. 488 (1974).

94.
95.
96.

Littleton v. Berbling, 468 F.2d 389 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1143 (1974).
414 U.S. at 499 (citing Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971)).
414 U.S. at 502.

97.

446 U.S. 719 (1980).
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whether judicial immunity would bar prospective relief for judges acting in their judicial role. The Court instead employed a functional
analysis to find that the court has three roles: judicial, legislative, and
enforcement. The Virginia Supreme Court, the Court determined, was
acting in a legislative capacity in its enactment of the state bar's disciplinary rules. 8 As such it was absolutely immune from both damages
and injunctive relief.'9 The court and the chief justice when acting in
an enforcement capacity, however, were "proper defendants in a suit
for declaratory and injunctive relief, just as other enforcement officers
and agencies were." 10 0
Consumers Union introduces yet another major element into the
issue of judicial immunity: the awarding of attorney's fees to successful
litigants seeking injunctive relief under section 1983. In 1976, Congress
passed the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Award Act [Section 19881.101
The Act provides that in any action under section 1983 and other civil
rights acts, the court, in its discretion, may award reasonable attorney's
fees to the prevailing party. 102 Prevailing party was defined to include
one who has vindicated rights without necessarily attaining relief. 103
The Act resulted from the Supreme Court's decision in Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society. 104 In Alyeska, the Court halted
an expanding trend to award attorney's fees when the plaintiff prevailed in the unique role as a private attorney general. Such a trend
was based largely on lower courts' reading of Newman v. Piggie
Park, 05 which held that if the plaintiff did prevail, that person did so
"not for himself alone but also as a 'private attorney general,' vindicating a policy that Congress considered of the highest priority."' ' The
Court in Alyeska curtailed the trend by limiting the fee award to situations specifically authorized by Congress. Congress responded to this
limitation with section 1988.
In Consumers' Union,106A the Court held that attorney's fees
would not be awarded where prospective relief was barred by judicial
98. Id. at 731.
99. Id. at 731-32 (citing Eastland v. United States Servicemen's Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 502-03
(1975) and Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 376 (1951)).
100. Id. at 736.
101. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (Supp. V 1979).
102. Id.
103. S. REP. No. 94-101 I, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1976) reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEws 5908, 5912.

104. 421 U.S. 240 (1975).
105. 390 U.S. 400 (1968).
106. Id. at 402.
106A. 466 U.S. 719 (1980).
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immunity.10 7 On remand, however, the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of Virginia reinstated the award of attorney's fees
against the Virginia Supreme Court.'0 8 This was based on the Supreme
Court's dicta in Consumer's Union that a fee award resting on the Virginia Supreme Court's enforcement role would not be improper. 0 9
In Pulliam v. Allen,"' the Supreme Court for the first time
squarely faced the issue of prospective relief against a judge under section 1983. Before addressing the issue of the award of attorney's fees
under section 1988, the court focused on the more fundamental issue of
judicial immunity.
While conceding that "[alt the common law itself, there was no
such thing as an injunction against a judge,""' the Court endeavored
to find a common law parallel to the section 1983 injunction in the use
of the King's prerogative writs. Among the writs available to the King's
Bench in its exercise of collateral control over "inferior and rival
courts," the most relevant for the Court were the writs of prohibition
and mandamus." 2 The former was issued to prevent a judge from exceeding his jurisdiction; the latter required him to exercise his jurisdiction. For the majority, the use of such writs suggested that judicial
control was not incompatible with the concomitant rise of judicial immunity." 3 Important for the majority, too, was that the use of such
writs was not limited to situations "where no alternative avenue of review was available."" 4 Thus, the majority seemed to want to structure
a system of judicial immunity that would be parallel to that of England. The persuasiveness of such a parallel depends, of course, on the
degree of "kinship" perceived between the English writs and the section
1983 injunction. The dissent argued that such a relationship is not a
close one: "The prerogative writs . . . are simply not analogous to suits
for injunctive relief ... ."I's Such writs control only the proper exercise of jurisdiction and not acts within a judge's jurisdiction protected
by judicial immunity. Magistrate Pulliam was within her jurisdiction
and injunctive relief was "based solely on an erroneous construction
107.
108.
462 U.S.
109.
110.
II.
112.
113.
114.
115.

446 U.S. at 738-39.
505 F. Supp. 822 (E.D. Va. 1981), afl'd, 688 F.2d 218 (4th Cir. 1982), cert. denied,
1137 (1983).
446 U.S. at 738.
104 S. Ct. 1970 (1984).
Id. at 1974.
Id. at 1976.
Id. at 1978.
Id.
Id. at 1985 (Powell, J., dissenting).
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and application of law."' 6 The dissent also points out that in this country such writs are used sparingly and only "where the court has a clear
duty to act."' 17 Further, the award of costs in an action for mandamus
or prohibition is made "only against the party at interest and not
against the judge."" 8
Turning from English common law to the legislative history of section 1983, the majority confronted Pierson v. Ray' 9 in which the court
based its holding on the premise that the common law doctrine of judicial immunity would be preserved without clear congressional intent to
abrogate it. The majority seemed not to distinguish Pierson so much as
simply to point out that if one overlooks the premise on which Pierson
is based, the intent of Congress to include judges within the sweep of
the Civil Rights Acts was pretty clear after all.119A The majority also
noted that no court in subsequent case law has had a rule of absolute
judicial immunity from prospective relief.119B
In a relatively brief consideration of policy issues the majority recognized that injunctive relief raises concerns different from those addressed by the protection of judges from damage awards. 120 The normal requirements of equity-the showing of an inadequate remedy at
law and irreparable harm-will limit the use of prospective relief and
"curtail the risk that judges will be harassed and their independence
compromised . . . ."I" The majority also pointed to possible case or
controversy considerations under article III of the Constitution which
may also serve to limit the number of successful suits. Curiously, the
majority cited In re Justices of Supreme Court of Puerto Rico, 22 a
decision based on proper party analysis and explicitly not based on article III grounds.12 3 Finally, the majority reaffirmed the restraints of
116. Id.
117. Id. at 1986.
118. Id.
119. 386 U.S. 547 (1967).
I I9A. 104 S. Ct. at 1980.
119B. Id. at 1978.
120. Id.
121. 104 S.Ct. at 1978-79. As the dissent in Pulliam points out, however, adequate remedies
were available to the respondents under Virginia laws (writ of habeas corpus and the appeal of
unreasonable bail) and there was no showing of irreparable harm. 104 S. Ct. at 1987 and n.13.
(Powell, J.,dissenting). To this the majority responds that given the shortness of the jail sentences
it may not have been possible to use these remedies. More importantly the majority points out that
Pulliam did not appeal the injunctive relief. "There has been no showing because respondents
never have been called on to make such a showing." 104 S. Ct. at 1981, n.22.
122. 695 F.2d 17 (1st Cir. 1982).
123. Justices was decided on the basis of a proper party analysis and while the court suggested that there was no case or controversy it expressly avoided this constitutional basis for its
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comity and federalism"' in the enjoining of judicial officers.' 2 5 For the
dissent, the possibility of contempt for a violation of the injunction was
as likely to interfere with "unbiased judicial decisionmaking as much
as the threat of liability for damages.'
Lastly, the majority returned to the initial question of section 1988
and the award of attorney's fees. While conceding that attorney's fees
may indeed be equivalent to money damages, "Congress has made...
clear in [section] 1988 its intent that attorney's fees be available in any
action to enforce a provision of [section] 1983.""1 The dissent did not
argue the applicability of section 1988 but simply chastized the majority for ignoring the dissent's perception of reality. For the dissenters it
was all too clear that the combination of the availability of prospective
relief and the award of attorney's fees together are a serious threat of
28
harassing litigation and an erosion of judicial independence.
Since the time of Lord Coke the various policy concerns surrounding the question of judicial liability have been of primary importance.
In this context it is difficult to understand the majority's extensive attempt to couch the issue in historical terms. The question of whether or
not, on the basis of English history, section 1983 injunctive relief can
coexist with judicial immunity from damages, does not seem to focus
on the primary issue. The real issue is whether, in a balance of the
various policies, the granting of injunctive relief and claims for damages emerge differently enough to allow one and not the other.
The policy concerns of judicial immunity or liability consist of
three core elements. 2 9 First, there is the magnitude of the harm. This
embraces the frequency of misconduct, the quantum of injury, and the
effectiveness of redress. The second element is the cost of liability including the frequency of actions and their effect, and the degree of
interference with judicial decision making and fact finding. The third is
the impact of the liability on the judicial process. This admittedly
vague element has been termed "the insurmountable barrier to a satisfactory analysis of the problem" because of the impossibility of achieving agreement on the definition of justice and the costs that should be
holding.
124. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971); Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225 (1972).
125. 104 S. Ct. at 1979-80.
126. Id. at 1988 (Powell, J., dissenting).
127. Id. at 1981-82.
128. Id. at 1988-89.
129. Feinman and Cohen, Suing Judges: History and Theory, 31 S. C. L. REv. 201, 274
(1980); see also Baxter, Enterprise Liability, Public and Private, 42 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBs. 45
(1978).

1985-86]

JUDICIAL IMMUNITY

incurred to attain it.' 30
The Pulliam Court in its abbreviated policy analysis addressed the
costs of judicial liability to injunctive relief. The Court found, in contrast to suits for damages, that suits for prospective relief present costlimiting considerations that would minimize the threat to judicial independence. These operate either to reduce the frequency with which
such suits are filed or their likelihood of success.
One such consideration is that suits for injunctive relief will be
possible only where there is a continuing judicial practice or the constitutionality of a state statute is challenged."' Clearly, this factual setting will occur less frequently than isolated instances of judicial misconduct which historically led to suits for damages. In the balance, the
cost of injunctive relief will be less than potential damage claims as
measured by the number of suits filed. The repeatable nature of the
impermissible acts also increases the magnitude of the harm. With respect to the third element, the achieved cessation of continuing impermissable practices arguably increases the quantum of justice delivered to society.
The basic requirements for injunctive relief-irreparable harm
and the inadequacy of a remedy at law-will also limit the number of
successful lawsuits. These prerequisites of equity also insure that the
magnitude of the harm must be substantial. 13 As noted by the Pulliam
Court, where a federal court seeks to enjoin a pending state court proceeding, "even irreparable injury is insufficient unless it is 'both great
and immediate.' "133
Article III concerns and proper party analysis coupled with the
traditional restraints of comity and federalism also provide formidable
limits on the use of prospective relief against judicial officers.134 Their
primary effect is to decrease cost by reducing the number of lawsuits
filed. On the facts of Pulliam, however, neither these limits nor the
limits imposed by the requirements of equity were adequate. Enjoining
Magistrate Pulliam was the only way to insure relief to the parties.
130. Baxter, supra note 129, at 46.
131. This fundamental consideration is not specifically addressed in Pulliam but stems from
the recognition of injunctive relief as raising different concerns from those of damage awards.
132. See Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 506-507 (1959).
133. 104 S. Ct. at 179 n.17 (quoting Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 46 (1971)).
134. See, e.g., O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488 (1974) (article IIIand comity); R.W.T. v.
Dalton, 712 F.2d 1225 (8th Cir. 1983) (proper party); In re Justices of Supreme Court of Puerto
Rico, 695 F.2d 17 (Ist Cir. 1982) (proper party); Conover v. Montemuro, 427 F.2d 1073 (3rd
Cir. 1973) (comity and federalism); United States v. Clark, 249 F. Supp. 720 (S.D. Ala. 1965)
(injunction not necessary against judge--essentially a proper party case without calling it such).
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Factual patterns requiring injunctions against judges are not common, 135 and as noted in Justices "it is ordinarily presumed that judges
will comply with a declaration of a statute's unconstitutionality without
further compulsion." ' 13 6
If the exposure of judges to injunctive relief was the only issue it
seems doubtful that the core elements would balance in favor of immunity. There would, of course, be costs associated with the defense of
such suits and the prospect of contempt might to some degree impair
independent decision making. Yet the legal limitations to such actions
coupled with the financial costs incurred by the parties seeking relief
would keep such suits few in number. Successful actions would typically be those in which the magnitude of the harm was great and where
there would be significant impact on the quantum of justice to society
to prompt the seeking of injunctive relief.
Without question the passage of the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees
Award Act (section 1988) shifts the balance of the core policy elements. First, section 1988 will increase the incentive to sue for injunctive relief under section 1983.137 While the number of such suits may
increase, section 1988 provides no monetary gain for the party and with
its requirement that the party prevail does not guarantee an award of
fees. Thus, the magnitude of the harm and chance of success must still
be sufficient to induce the claimant to bear the non-monetary costs of
such suits and to entice the attorney to undertake the cause. Second,
the award of attorney's fees has been viewed as the functional
equivalent of damage awards and as carrying the same chilling effect
on judicial independence. The majority of the Pulliam Court acknowl135. A review of the recent circuit court of appeals' decisions reveals fact patterns in which
the judge could have been excluded as a party defendant. Heimbach v. Village of Lyons, 597 F.2d
344 (2d Cir. 1979) is illustrative. There, a section 1983 civil rights action was brought against the
village, the village justice of the peace and village officials alleging that they had illegally attempted to evict low income people from their houses. It appears an injunction against the police
officers and those officials enforcing the codes could have afforded complete relief. Other decisions
within the circuits, however, would have necessitated enjoining a judge. Cf.WXYZ, Inc. v. Hand,
658 F.2d 420 (6th Cir. 1981) (injunction against state court enforcement of prior court suppression order).
136. 695 F.2d at 23.
137. As noted by the dissent in Pulliam,civil rights suits filed by state prisoners against state
officials increased 115.6% over the number of such suits filed in 1977 before the award of fees
became available. 104 S. Ct. 1988, n.16 (citing the Annual Report of the Director of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts 100-103 (1982)). While such a statistic is of interest it
does not establish a clear cause and effect relationship. Civil rights actions have been growing in
number steadily for the past two decades. The datum also does not reveal the number of these
actions which involved judges.
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edges this. 138 However, the award of attorney's fees is arguably not precisely the same as a damage award. It does not carry the same sense of
wrongdoing, and by the extent to which the case is pursued, the size of
the fee is controllable by the judge defendant.
At this juncture the enhancement of costs as measured by increased litigation brought about by section 1988 is speculative. To the
majority in Pulliam these as yet uncertain costs were not outweighed
by the likely magnitude of the harms to be corrected and the availability of legal devices to filter out all but the most meritorious actions.
If the Court were to employ principles of judicial immunity to enhance further the limitations already imposed by principles of comity
and federalism on the availability of injunctive relief against a state
judge, it would foreclose relief in situations where, in the opinion of a
federal judge, that relief is constitutionally required and necessary to
prevent irreparable harm.'
Pulliam v. Allen leaves us in a wait and see position. If indeed the
prophecy of the dissent, a dramatic rise in injunctive relief sought
against judges, is realized, Congress has an easy remedy by limiting the
scope of section 1988 to exclude fees in suits brought against judges.
Unlike the seeking of damages by a single disgruntled litigant, the
stakes are higher with the seeking of injunctive relief which arrests
continuing impermissible practices. Thus, at present, the balancing of
the various core elements should, as the Pulliam court has done, be
allowed to proceed so that any curtailment of section 1988 is based on
fact, not speculation.
Robert S. Irving

138.
139.

104 S. Ct. at 1981.
104 S. Ct. at 1980.

